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THE NORTH CAROLINA HEARSAY RULI,
AND THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE*
LEONARD S. POWERS**
Ix
HEARSAY OF AN UNAVAILABLE DECLARANT
.The hearsay exceptions to be dealt with in this installment are those
in which unavailability of the declarant is a requirement. Those covered
in the previous installment were those in which unavailability has no
bearing. It can be argued that unavailability of the hearsay declarant
ought to have nothing to do with the problem of whether hearsay should
be admitted in evidence. This argument is that the principal reason
for the hearsay rule is the absence of an opportunity for cross-examina-
tion, and unavailability of the declarant does not to any extent supplant
this test. Unavailability of the hearsay declarant does not contribute
to the trustworthiness of his statements uttered out of court. It is
true, of course, that his unavailability may supply a compelling motive
for admitting the statements, but the original taint coming from lack
of cross-examination is not removed nor mitigated by such a considera-
tion. Yet, if there is some circumstantial probability of trustworthiness
to join to the unavailability of the declarant, it would seem that the
minimum requirements for an exception to the rule against hearsay are
met.'
Several of the traditional exceptions require a showing of unavail-
ability.2 Such exceptions and their treatment in the Unifornt Rules will
now be discussed, but they are overshadowed by a broad exception based
in part on unavailability which is undoubtedly the most far-reaching
change proposed by the Commissioners. It is a modification of Rule
503 (a) of the Model Code which provided that "Evidence of a hearsay
declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant is unavail-
able as a witness. . . ."3 This was said to be "the most objectionable fea-
* This is the second and concluding portion of this article.
**Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of North Carolina; former
Professor of Law, Wake Forest College School of Law.
1 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1423 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited Wia-
MOPr, EVIDENCE).
'Prior testimony, dying declarations, and statements of family history. Declara-
tions against interest must meet the unavailability requirement in most jurisdic-
tions, but not under the UNIFORM RULES. See the discussion of this wholesomd
proposal in 34 N. C. L. REV. 171, 196 (1956).
' MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 503 (a) (1942).
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ture of the Model Code from the standpoint of practicing lawyers." 4 The
modified rule would make admissible, if the declarant is unavailable
as a witness, "a statement narrating, describing or explaining an event
or condition which the judge finds was made by the declarant at a time
when the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his
recollection was clear, and was made in good faith prior to the com-
mencement of the action." 5
The Model Code provision would have admitted practically all first-
hand hearsay if the judge found the declarant to be unavailable. The
Uniform Rules provision requires that other findings be made by the
judge, the effect of which is to set some standards limiting the exception.
The new clause was "drafted so as to indicate an attitude of reluctance
and require most careful scrutiny in admitting hearsay statements under
its provisions."
There has long been agitation for some relaxation of the hearsay
rule, and most of it has centered on a demand for a new exception such
as that now under consideration. Massachusetts has had a statute pro-
viding for the admissibility of declarations of deceased persons since
1898.7 A survey was made in 1922 by the Commonwealth Fund Com-
mittee to ascertain how the lawyers and judges of Massachusetts thought
the statute had worked. The results indicated that, in the opinion of
the profession in Massachusetts, the statute had operated satisfactorily.8
Rhode Island has a similar statute.9 In 1938, the American Bar Associa-
tion recommended a statute of this type.' 0 The English Evidence Act
of 1938 contains an exception along these lines, but it is limited to
written hearsay statements.1
The proposal in the Uniform Rules, the Massachusetts statute before
'Gard, Panel on Uniform Rides of Evidence, 8 ARK. L. REV. 44, 46-7 (1954).
UNIFORm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, rule 63 (4) (c).
'Id., comment.
'In its present amended form, it reads as follows: "In any action or other
civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible
as hearsay . . . if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the
personal knowledge of the declarant." MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 233, § 65 (1954).
Before the amendment of 1943, this statute required the declaration to have been
made prior to the commencement of the action. Note that the UNIFORM RJLEs
proposal contains such a requirement.
8 'MORGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM 39-49(1927).
' "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as
hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement
of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant." R. I. GEN.
LAWS, C. 538, § 6 (1938).
10 "That declarations of a deceased or insane person should be received in evi-
dence if the trial judge shall find (1) that the person is dead or insane, (2) that
the declaration was made and (3) that it was made in good faith before the com-
mencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."
VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADmINISTRATION 321,338 (1949).
" 1 & 2 GEO. 6, c. 28, sec. 1.
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its amendment, and the Rhode Island statute all require the declaration
to have been made prior to the commencement of the action. The
Massachusetts statute and the English Act apply only to civil pro-
ceedings, but the Rhode Island statute and the proposal in the Uniform
Rules apply in both criminal and civil actions. The Massachusetts
statute only applies where the declarant is unavailable because of death.
The Rhode Island statute applies to the declarations of deceased and
insane persons. The English Act is broader than either of these, ad-
mitting the statement where the declarant is unavailable for any reason,
where he is called as a witness, and when the judge dispenses with
any requirement of his attendance or any showing of unavailability.
The proposal in the Model Code was based on a very broad definition
of unavailability, which, in effect, provided that any inability to secure
the declarant's testimony established unavailability if not due to the
fault or procurement of the proponent of the evidence.12  It was, per-
haps, this wide-open definition of unavailability which led to suspicions
that the real effect of the proposal was to abolish the hearsay rule.'8
Thus, it is clear that the definition of "unavailability" is a considera-
tion in evaluating a proposed exception based on it. The definition in
the Uniform Rules is much like that in the Model Code.14 The Com-
missioners state that the definition is carefully framed "so as to give
assurance against the planned or fraudulent absence of the declarant."' 5
It is not on a narrow definition of "unavailability" which the proposal
principally depends for its merit, but, properly, on findings by the judge
12 
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 1 (15) (1942).
13 "[It] opened the door to everything but secondary hearsay, to everything
but gossip, and almost opened the door to gossip." Gard, supra note 4, at 47.
I" "'Unavailable as a witness' includes situations where the witness is (a)
exempted on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which
his statement is relevant, or (b) disqualified from testifying to the matter, or (c)
unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness, or (d) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to
compel appearance by its process, or (e) absent from the place of hearing because
the proponent of his statement does not know and with diligence has been unable
to ascertain his whereabouts.
But a witness is not unavailable (a) if the judge finds that his exemption, dis-
qualification, inability or absence is due to procurement or wrongdoing of the pro-
ponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending
or testifying, or to the culpable neglect of such party, or (b) if unavailability is
claimed under clause (d) of the preceding paragraph and the judge finds that
the deposition of the declarant could have been taken by the exercise of reasonable
diligence and without undue hardship, and that the probable importance of the
testimony is such as to justify the expense of taking such deposition." UNIFORM1
RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 62 (7).
"I UNIFORm RLES OF EVIDENCE, rule 63 (4), comment. "In view of the fact
that unavailability of the declarant is an important condition under a number of
exceptions, a safe definition of 'unavailable as a witness' becomes absolutely
essential. The objective is to assure that unavailability is honest and not planned
in order to gain an advantage. This definition gives the judge considerable dis-
cretion to reject the offer if he is not satisfied that the absence of the declarant is
legitimately explained." Id. at rule 62, comment.
[Vol. 34
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which assure a substantial basis for trustworthiness. In other words,
the findings required by the exception are such as to provide a sub-
stantial substitute for the missing test of cross-examination which is the
real basis for the rule against hearsay. The judge must find that the
statement was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had been
recently perceived by him, while his recollection was clear, in good
faith, and prior to the commencement of the action. It is clear that if
the judge cannot make the necessary findings for admission he should
exclude such a statement. Rule 1 (8) provides that "a ruling implies
a supporting finding of fact; no separate or formal finding is required
unless required by a statute of this state." This seems to mean that the
mere ruling of the judge admitting the evidence is sufficient to imply a
finding of the necessary facts. Thus no formal findings are necessary
as to the foundation facts. This would have significance largely on ap-
peals, no express findings needing to appear in the record. It is
assumed, of course, that such an implied finding unsupported by evi-
dence would be subject to attack on appeal. Without the benefit of such
a statute as Rule 1 (8), the North Carolina Court in a similar situation
has held that an express finding should appear in the record. 16
It is undoubtedly true that some reliable hearsay cannot be fitted
into the present rigid hearsay exceptions. For example, consider a
statement made concerning a transaction by a person since deceased,
litigation having arisen concerning the transaction. The hearsay state-
ment of the deceased may be the only evidence favorable to the estate.
Similarly, the exception for dying declarations does not cover many
situations where statements are made prior to death by a solitary work-
man who alone knew how the accident happened in which he was in-
jured. As expressed by the Commissioners, "the fact remains that
there is a vital need for a provision such as this to prevent miscarriage
of justice resulting from the arbitrary exclusion of evidence which is
worthy of consideration, when it is the best evidence available."1
In Towe v. Penland,'s respondent claimed sole ownership in a pro-
ceeding for partition on the contention that he had conveyed to the other
party a one-half interest in a lot inherited from their father under an
agreement that he was to have the entire use of the land owned by the
parties as heirs at law of their mother. The respondent offered testi-
mony of declarations made by the mother prior to her death intestate
"6 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N. C. 199, 139 S. E. 228 (1927).
It has been argued that express findings of fact should be required in connection
with the proposed exception under consideration. This argument is based on the
feeling that Rule 1 (8) makes the "substantial basis for trustworthiness" found in
the requirement of preliminary findings "to some degree illusory." Falknor, The
Hearsay Ride and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rxv. 43, 64-5 (1954).
" UNIFORm RULEs o1'VIDENC rule 63 (4), comment.
18231 N. C. 504, 57 S. E. 2d 652 (1950).
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tending to confirm the agreement as contended for by the respondent.
One witness would have testified that "Mrs. Hall told me that she had
it fixed so there would not be any fussing at her death; that she just
had two children and just had two homes; that she wanted one to have
one and the other to have the other home .... She said that her son
Oliver had signed his part to his sister, so that at her death Oliver
would get her house." The admission of this hearsay was held error.
Under the proposed change, it would probably be admitted, assuming
that the necessary findings could be made by the judge.
The Uniform Rules do not contain a "dead man's statute." Rule
7 serves to abolish such a statute, and it is not reintroduced by any other
rule. This is in line with the vigorous attack which has been made
against this remnant of the earlier rule that interest renders a witness
incompetent.'9  North Carolina, of course, has such a statute,20 and it
is enforced with vigor by our courts. 21 No prolonged discussion of the
problem will be undertaken here, for it is not primarily a hearsay matter.
Such declarations come within the exception for admissions insofar as
"9 MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 25; STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA
LAW 0F EVIENCE § 66 n. 33 (1946) (hereinafter cited as STANSBURY, N. C. EVI-
DENCE) ; VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 334 et seq. "The argument . . .
that a contrary rule 'would place in great peril the estates of the dead' sufficiently
typifies the superficial reasoning on which the rule rests. Are not the estates
of the living endangered daily by the present rule, which bars from proof so manyhonest claims? Can it be more important to save dead men's estates from false
claims than to save living men's estates from loss by lack of proof? . . . As a
matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded interest-qualification
is deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a fallacious and exploded prin-
ciple, it leads to as much or more false decision than it prevents, and its en-
cumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren quibbles over the interpre-
tation of mere words." 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578. Nine states have abolished
or never had such a disqualification. Abolition of it has been proposed in North
Carolina. Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina, 11 N. C. L. REV. 51,
61-3 (1932) ; Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 230 (1935). For a case illustrating theillogical distinctions arising under the Dead Man's Statute, see Hardison v.
Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 88 S. E. 2d 96 (1955) and the criticism of it in 34
N. C. L. REV. 53-4 (1955).
"0 "Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon the merits of a special pro-
ceeding, a party or a person interested in the event, or a person from, through or
under whom such a party or interested person derives his interest or title by assign-
ment or otherwise, shall not be examined as a witness in his own behalf or interest,
or in behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest, against the executor,
administrator or survivor of a deceased person, or the commitee of a lunatic, or a
person deriving his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person orlunatic, by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal transaction or com-
munication between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic; except where
the executor, administrator, survivor, committee or person so deriving title or in-
terest is examined in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased
person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or communication."
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1955).
2 Sanderson v. Paul, 235 N. C. 56, 69 S. E. 2d 156 (1952) ; Peek v. Shook,233 N. C. 259, 63 S. E. 2d 542 (1951) ; Price v. Whisnant, 232 N. C. 653, 62 S. E.
2d 56 (1950) : Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C. 396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947) ; Perry v.
Trust Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E. 2d 116(1946) ; In re Will of Lomax, 226 N. C.
498, 39 S. E. 2d 388 (1946) ; STANSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE §§ 66-75.
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the hearsay rule is concerned, and thus would be admissible were it not
for the statute. The abolition of the "dead man's statute" does have a
connection with the proposal under discussion, however, for the proposed
rule would render the statements of the deceased favorable to his estate
admissible. This is important because the favorable statements which
the estate might wish to offer are not admissions of a party and other-
wise would not usually come within an exception to the rule against
hearsay. Under the proposal being considered, the statements of the
deceased as to the transactions "would be an impressive counterweight
to the testimony of the survivor."22 In fairness, this ought to be avail-
able to the estate of the deceased, along with the testimony of other
witnesses to the transaction and cross-examination of the interested
survivor. To avoid any question, "it is arguable that the Rules should
be supplemented by a broad provision for the admission of all declara-
tions of the deceased, in cases where the surviving party testifies against
the estate." 23
This proposed exception is so broad as to include within its bounds
many hearsay statements which might also fall within some other hear-
say exception requiring unavailability such as a dying declaration. The
overlapping will cause no particular difficulty, and a little reflection will
reveal that situations arise where the statement would qualify under
the proposed exception and not under one of the traditional exceptions
requiring unavailability and vice versa.
The Uniform Rules do not contain an exception for declarations
concerning boundaries made by disinterested persons who are now dead,
an exception recognized in this and many other states.24  This is un-
doubtedly because such statements can be admitted under the proposed
exception, and, indeed, will probably be more freely admitted since death
is the only type of unavailability which has been recognized for this
exception in North Carolina.25
The arguments in favor of this broad exception are very convincing.
It would not be forthright, however, to contend that it does not repre-
sent a major relaxation of the rule against hearsay. The most reasonable
position seems to be that even though it is a significant change, it is
justified on grounds of policy, expediency, and the historical considera-
tions dealt with in the first part of this paper. There can be no major
reform of the hearsay rule without a major change such as this.
12 McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAS
L. REV. 559, 564 (1955).
2" McCormick, supra note 22, at 565.
" White v. Price, 237 N. C. 347, 75 S. E. 2d 244 (1953) ; STAsBuRY, N. C.
EVIDENCE § 151.
" STANSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 151, n. 86.
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TEsTIMONY TAKEN AT A FORMER TRIAL
One of the principal exceptions to the hearsay rule is that for the
testimony of a witness in a prior trial. This exception has been limited
by various requirements designed to assure an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination. Generally, most jurisdictions have insisted that the
witness be unavailable at the present trial and that the former trial at
which the testimony of the witness was taken have involved the same
issues and the same parties. There has been a great deal of division on
how strictly these requirements should be applied. Basically, the ex-
ception covers highly reliable hearsay, for the testimony at the former
trial was under oath and an opportunity for cross-examination was
available, and thus it has reliability similar to a deposition which is also
taken under oath with an opportunity to cross-examine being afforded.
Indeed, there is a division of opinion on whether prior testimony
should even be regarded as hearsay. Wigmore contended that the
requirements of the hearsay rule were met by such evidence, since an
opportunity for cross-examination was presented and not some substitute
for it. 26 With the basic reason for the hearsay rule not involved, it was
felt that it would be improper to classify such statements as hearsay.
This was bolstered by the fact that such testimony was given under oath.
The more general view has been that such evidence is hearsay, but that
an effective substitute for present cross-examination exists and that,
therefore, it falls within an exception to the rule.27 Under this view,
only testimony taken at the present trial and subject to cross-examina-
tion at that trial is outside the definition of hearsay if offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.
Occasionally, testimony taken at a former trial may be used for
the purpose of refreshing a witness or for impeachment. If so, the hear-
say rule and the limitations of the exception under consideration do
not apply. Also, it is possible that former testimony may come within
some other exception to the rule against hearsay such as the admission of
a party opponent or declaration against interest, in which case the re-
quirements of the exception for prior testimony are not applicable.
The exception under consideration is expressed as follows in the
Uniform Rules: "Subject to the same limitations and objections as
though the declarant were testifying in person . . . if the judge finds
that the declarant is unavailable as a witness at the hearing, testimony
given as a witness in another action or in a deposition taken in com-
285 WIGMoR, EVIDENcE § 1370.
2 7 McCoRmicK, HANDBOOK OF THF LAW OF EvmENcE § 230 (1954) (hereinafter
cited as McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE) ; McK.ELvm, EviDExCE § 227 (1944) ; STANSBURY,
N. C. EviDExcE § 145.
[Vol. 34
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pliance with law for use as testimony in the trial of another action, when
(i) the testimony is offered against a party who offered it in his own
behalf on the former occasion, or against the successor in interest of such
party, or (ii) the issue is such that the adverse party on the former
occasion had the right and opportunity for cross examination with an
interest and motive similar to that which the adverse party has in the
action in which the testimony is offered."28
The requirement that the witness at the former trial be unavailable
is preserved in the proposed rule, but "unavailable as a witness" is given
a broad definition in the Rules which will serve in many jurisdictions
to abolish unreasonable limitations and distinctions based on whether the
litigation is civil or criminal.2 9 Constitutional provisions concerning con-
frontation have led some courts toward stricter requirements regarding
unavailability in criminal than in civil cases. 30 Fortunately, this has not
been the case in North Carolina, and unavailability in the form of death,
insanity, illness, and removal from the jurisdiction are recognized.3 '
The modern trend has been in this direction.
The substantial change which the proposed exception would effect
is in the traditional requirement of identity of parties and issues. Cer-
tainly, if both parties in the two trials are the same, the requirement as
to identity of parties is met. Similarly, it is sufficient that the present
party, though not the same, is a privy in interest with the corresponding
party in the earlier trial. Wigmore went further and contended that the
identity of parties requirement was sufficiently observed if the party
against whom the former testimony is now offered was the party against
whom it was offered in the first trial.3 2 Thus, identity of party in the
sense that the proponent needed to be the same in both trials has not
been insisted upon by a growing number of recent decisions, and such
is the rule in North Carolina. 3  The proposed rule goes a step further
and drops any requirement of identity of party on either side, provided
"the issue is such that the adverse party on the former occasion had
the right and opportunity for cross-examination with an ititerest and
motive similar to that which the adverse party has in the action in which
the testimony is offered." There is considerable support for this posi-
" UNirFoR Rui.Es OF EVIDENC, rule 63 (3).
"' McCoRmIcK, EviDENcE § 234.301d. § 231.1 STANsBuRY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 145 notes 63-67. Evidence taken at the pre-
liminary examination of an accused is admissible at the criminal trial by statute
where the witness is unavailable. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-100 (1955). The evi-
dence must be taken as prescribed by statute. N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-88, 91(1955).
5 WIGoRE, Evi:DENc § 1388.
"Hartis v. Charlotte Elec. Ry. Co., 162 N. C. 236, 78 S. E. 164 (1913).
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tion.24 Yet, it can be argued convincingly that a party against whom
the prior testimony is offered should have had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness himself. That someone else had an opportunity
to cross-examine the absent witness in the earlier trial may not satisfy
all critics. 5 While North Carolina has relaxed the mutuality of parties
requirement to the extent that only identity of opponent is necessary,
the cases do not indicate that the Court is disposed to go beyond this
point.36
The argument that the opponent against whom the prior testimony
is offered ought not to be forced to accept the cross-examination of
another unrelated party who may not have conducted an effective cross-
examination at the former trial would be convincing if the matter were
one involving the doctrine of res judicata. In such a case, the issue
could not be relitigated. In the matter under consideration, however,
the prior testimony is only evidence and may be disbelieved by the jury.
The prior testimony can be met with contradictory testimony and the
unavailable witness impeached.
A related requirement is that of identity of issues in the two trials.
While it is sometimes said that the issue in the two trials must be the
same, this is taken to mean that the issue on which the testimony was
offered in the first trial must be substantially the same as the issue upon
which it is offered in the second.3 7  In North Carolina, it has been
held that the prior testimony must have been given in the trial of a
cause involving the same issue and subject matter as the one in which
the evidence is offered.38  There is no difficulty where the prior testi-
mony was given at a former trial of the same cause of action or at a
:" Bartlett v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S. W. 2d 740(1942) ; McCoRmicK, EvmcE § 232; 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1388; Morgan
The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 551 (1946).
" "My own opinion is that the 'mutuality' idea-the requirement of identity of
parties on both sides-cannot rationally be supported. But I question the wisdom
of dispensing with the requirement of identity of opponent." Falknor, The Hearsay
Ride and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. REv. 43, 58 (1954).
" "The admissibility in evidence of testimony taken in another action depends
not only upon the identity of the question being investigated, but upon the op-
portunity of the party against whom the evidence is offered, to cross-examine."
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Reid Motor Co., 216 N. C. 432, 435, 5 S. E. 2d 318,(1939) ; McLean v. Scheiber, 212 N. C. 544, 193 S. E. 708 (1937).
The court reporter statute was amended in 1955 to include the following:
"The testimony taken and transcribed by said court reporter or said court
reporter pro tern., as the case may be, and duly certified, either by said reporter
or the presiding judge at the trial of the cause, may be offered in evidence in any
of the courts of this State as the deposition of the witness whose testimony is
taken and transcribed, in the same manner, and under the same rules governing
the introduction of depositions in civil actions." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-89 (1955).
This is subject to the construction that mutuality requirements are abolished.
Court reporter statutes for specific judicial districts had long had such a provision.
They were repealed in 1955.
'r MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 233.
"STAxSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 145 n. 70.
(Vol. 34
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preliminary stage of the same trial. Parrish v. Bryant" illustrates a
more difficult situation. The first action was a criminal proceeding
arising out of an automobile accident against a defendant who was a de-
fendant in a later civil action brought by the injured party. Plaintiff in
the civil action sought to enter a transcript of testimony taken in the crim-
inal proceeding from a witness unavailable at the trial of the civil action.
It was held that the plaintiff failed to show the identity of the issues
in the civil action with those of the former criminal prosecution. The
Court stated that the question of the identity of the issues is a preliminary
question to be decided by the court before any evidence at a former trial
is competent.
One factor which may affect the manner in which a jurisdiction
observes the requirement of identity of issues is the breadth of the scope
of cross-examination rule recognized in the jurisdiction. If a jurisdiction
follows the wide scope of cross-examination rule, then unless all the
issues of the second trial were present in the first trial the party against
whom the testimony is offered will be deprived of his right to cross-
examine the absent witness on all the issues of the second trial.40 North
Carolina, of course, observes the wide scope of cross-examination rule.
41
In the Parrish case, it was pointed out that contributory negligence was
an issue in the second trial but not in the first.
The Unifo rm Rules deal with the identity of issues requirement
in a general but logical way. The issue in the second trial must be
such that the adverse party on the former occasion had the right and
opportunity for cross-examination with an interest and motive similar
to that which the adverse party has in the second trial. Thus the policy
of securing an adequate opportunity for cross-examination by the party
against whom the evidence is now offered or by someone with a like
interest is observed without getting into detailed specifications about
the similarity of issues. This leaves something to the judgment of the
trial judge, but judges deal with other preliminary questions on which
the admissibility of evidence depends with similar or greater freedom.
The Rule under consideration would admit prior testimony against
a party which the same party or his successor in interest offered in his
own behalf at the first trial. This raises the question of whether the
opportunity for direct and redirect examination at the first trial is the
equivalent of an opportunity for cross-examination at the second trial.
Should a party be bound by testimony he elicited himself at a former
trial? There is some authority for regarding such testimony as an
" 237 N. C. 256, 74 S. E. 2d 726 (1953), 32 N. C. L. Rlv. 455 (1954).
40 A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois Evidenwe Law,
49 Nw. U. L. RIv. 481, 493 (1954).
" SANSBuRY, N. C. EvIDENcE § 35 n. 57.
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adoptive admission.42  There is also authority supporting the admissi-
bility of such prior testimony as coming within the exception for prior
testimony.43 Some argument may be made against this principle, how-
ever, in a state such as North Carolina which restricts severely the im-
peachment by a party of a witness called by that party.44 The conse-
quences of the proposal in this respect would, in North Carolina, make
the testimony of a witness who is unavailable at the second trial ad-
missible against the party who offered the testimony at the first trial
where the testimony may have been disappointing but the offering party
could not conduct an effective cross-examination due to the restrictive
rule mentioned. Yet, the point may be made that such testimony is
not conclusive in the second trial against the party who offered it in
the first trial and should be admitted rather than lost altogether due to
the unavailabilty of the witness. While unrestricted cross-examination
was not available to the party against whom it is offered at the second
trial, there is some assurance of reliability in that direct and redirect
examination was available to him at the first trial, which is a far cry from
no testing at all.
The rule under consideration is subject to the construction that it
would admit a deposition taken for use as testimony in the trial of an
earlier action even though it was not offered into evidence at that trial.
This can be supported because cross-examination was available at the
taking of the deposition. In a North Carolina case where the deponent
was unavailable at the second trial, a deposition taken in connection with
the former trial was excluded, in part, because the deposition was not
introduced at the first trial.45  So this proposal might effect a change
in the local law of evidence.
The exception for prior testimony was not so important in the
Model Code46 because of the broad exception under Rule 503 (a) for
declarations of an unavailable declarant. The general exception for
statements of an unavailable declarant in the Uniform Rules will not
include prior testimony in most cases because of the requirement that
the judge must find that the statement "was made .. .prior to the
commencement of the action." 47  Some doubt might arise, however,
where the witness had testified, not in an earlier trial of the same action,
but in an entirely different case.
'1 McComicx, EvIDENcE § 246; 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENcE § 1075. Some Hearsay
Exceptions in the Uniform Rules of Evidence and New Jersey Evidence Law, 9
RuTERas L. REv. 555, 558 (1935) ; A Symposium on the Uniform Rides of Evi-
dence and Illinois Ezidence Law, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 481, 495 (1954).
"McCoRmuicK, EVIDENCE § 231; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1389.
"STANs URY, N. C. EvmE § 40.
"Mechanics Bank and Trust Co. v. Whilden, 175 N. C. 52, 94 S. E. 723 (1917).
€, MODEL CODE OF EViDENCE, rule 511 (1942).
"UNIFORM RuLEs OF EvmENCE, rule 63 (4) (c).
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Under both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules, the prior testi-
mony of a witness who is available and subject to cross-examination
may be admitted under the exception for previous statements.4 8
The more liberal treatment of the exception for prior testimony
found in the Uniform Rules as compared with the orthodox common
law principle, hedged about as it is with restirctions dealing largely with
requirements concerning identity of parties and issues, is doubtless
justified. Transcribed former testimony taken under oath is far more
reliable than the oral hearsay which is admissible under exceptions for
admissions, declarations against interest, declarations of present bodily
or mental state, and excited or contemporaneous utterances.4 9  These
exceptions admit hearsay without furnishing guaranties of trustworthi-
ness comparable to the test of cross-examination which is present with
prior testimony. As Morgan has written, "were the same strictness
applied to all hearsay, evidence of reported testimony would constitute
the only exception to the hearsay rule."50
XI
DYING DECLARATIONS
One of the oldest of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay is that
for dying declarations. That this should be true is not surprising in
view of the general belief that deathbed statements are likely to be true.
A dying declarant who knows he is about to die is not likely to be in-
fluenced by the usual motives for falsification. Also, there may be some
feeling that the solemnity of such an occasion provides a religious
motive for veracity equivalent to an oath. The common law exception
required the declarant to have made the statement while in full appre-
hension that he was in actual danger of death and his death to have
ensued.51 The exception in the Uniform Rules retains these require-
ments. Rule 63 (5) admits as an exception "a statement by a person
unavailable as a witness because of his death if the judge finds that it
was made voluntarily and in good faith and while the declarant was
conscious of his impending death and believed that there was no hope of
his recovery."
"MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 503 (b) (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVI-
DENCE, rule 63 (1).
CCOR mICK, EVIDENcE § 238.
'o Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 552 (1946).
" McCoRmicK, EVIDENcE § 259; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1430-52. Three re-
quirements for a dying declaration have been listed by the North Carolina Court:
(1) the declarant at the time he made the statement should have been in actual
danger of death; (2) he must have had full apprehension of his danger; and (3)
death must have ensued. State v. Gordon, 241 N. C. 356, 85 S. E. 2d 322 (1955) ;
State v. Rich, 231 N. C. 696, 58 S. E. 2d 717 (1950) ; State v. Ensley, 228 N. C.
271, 45 S. E. 2d 357 (1947) ; STANSBtuRY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 146; Note, 14 N. C. .L.
REv. 380 (1936).
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The broad exception based on unavailability in the Model Code made
it unnecessary to provide an exception for dying declarations as such,
Rule 503 (a) of the Model Code provided an exception for hearsay
declarations of unavailable declarants, and thus admitted all dying
declarations. The general exception based on unavailability has limita-
tions in the Uniform Rules.52 Of course, many dying declarations would
also qualify under Rule 63 (4) (c), but that exception is not coextensive
with Rule 63 (5) which covers dying declarations. Rule 63 (4) (c)
requires findings of recency of observation, clear recollection, and that
the statement was made prior to the commencement of the action. Some
of these might not be present with a dying declaration. Similarly, Rule
63 (5) requires a finding that the declarant was conscious of his im-
pending death and believed that there was no hope of his recovery.
Thus, a separate exception for dying declarations was logically necessary
in the Uniform Rules in order that statements coming within the bounds
of the common law exception but not qualifying under the general
unavailability exception might be admissible.
The principal change in this exception proposed by the Uniform
Rules is the elimination of the requirement that the exception be limited
to criminal prosecutions for homicide of the declarant. 8 This odd re-
striction on the common law exception seems to have been the result of
a mistake. An early nineteenth century treatise gave as a reason for
the exception for dying declarations that otherwise murderers might
escape unpunished due to the lack of the testimony of their victims.
Though this is certainly a situation where a dying declaration should
be heard, it was never intended that this be the only situation in which
such declarations should be admitted. Thus, though prior to this nine-
teenth century development, such declarations had been admitted in civil
cases, the idea that dying declarations should only be admitted in homi-
cide cases rapidly became the law nearly everywhere."4 At an early
date, a dying declaration was admitted in the trial of a civil action in
North Carolina.55 The decision so holding was overruled in 1854 by
Barfield v. Britt.56
UNiFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 63 (4) (c).
5 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 1432-3.
McCORmIcK, EVIDENCE § 260; Note, 1 N. C. L. REv. 113 (1922).
McFarland v. Shaw, 4 N. C. 200 (1815). This was a civil action for seduc-
tion in which the dying declaration of the plaintiff's daughter was admitted against
the defendant. Taylor, C. J. wrote:
"In cases where life is at stake, such evidence is uniformly received and credited,
and numerous are the victims to its authority recorded in the mournful annals of
human depravity. Can the practice of receiving it to destroy life, and rejecting it
where a compensation is sought for a civil injury, derive any sanction from reason,
justice, or analogy? And though no direct precedent may exist to guide the
Court, yet it must be recollected that the law consists of principles, which prece-
dents only tend to illustrate and confirm."
r-47 N. C. 41 (1854). Battle, J., wrote: "The importance of preserving it has
no doubt restricted the admission of dying declarations to the criminal cases only
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Such a restriction has nothing but history to support it. Though the
homicide situation might be one where necessity for the admission of
the statement of the victim is particularly strong, the circumstantial
guaranty of reliability is just as strong in other kinds of cases, civil
and criminal, and thus the removal of this limitation seems to be justi-
fied.57 Kansas has abolished the restriction to homicide cases by de-
cision, 58 and Colorado has done so by statute.59 Two states, one of them
being North Carolina, have broadened the exception by admitting dying
declarations in civil actions for wrongful death. 0
There are two other limitations generally recognized which stem
from the majority rule limiting dying declarations to criminal cases in-
volving homicide. One is that the defendant in the present trial must be
charged with the death of the declarant. That is, the dying declaration
of someone killed in the same fight in which the person was killed with
whose killing the defendant is charged is not admissible under the ortho-
dox exception."1 This illogical limitation is also abolished under the
proposal. Similarly, the usual view is that a dying declaration is ad-
missible only so far as it relates to the act of killing and the circum-
stances attending and leading up to the killing.62 This quibble is also
rejected in the proposed exception.
It is usually held that the dying declarant must have had personal
knowledge of the declared facts. 3 Such a requirement is omitted from
'where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances
of the death the subject of the declarations.' Such declarations, then, are admitted
'upon the ground of the public necessity of preserving the lives of the community
by bringing man-slayers to justice. For it often happens that there is no third per-
son present to be an eye-witness to the fact, and the usual witness in other cases
of felony, namely, the injured party, is himself destroyed.' See Cowen and Hill's
notes to Phil. Ev., Part I, 610; 1 Gr. Ev., sec. 156, and the cases there cited. The
principle of admission, being thus restricted, necessarily overrules the case of
McFarland v. Shaw, 4 N. C., 200, and shows that even if the issue be, as in this
case, whether the plaintiff murdered the deceased, the dying declarations cannot be
heard, because such issue is joined in a civil case."
"McCoRMICK, EVmENCE §§ 260, 264; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1432; Some
Hearsay Exceptions in the Uniform Rifles and New Jersey Evidence Law, 9
RUTGERS L. REV. 555, 565 (1955) ; Note, 14 N. C. L. REv. 380 (1936).
" Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914).
" CoLo. REv. STATS. c. 52, art. 1, § 20 (1953).
" "In all actions brought under this section the dying declarations of the cle-
ceased as to the cause of his death shall be admissible in evidence in like manner
and under the same rules as dying declarations of the deceased in criminal actions
for homicide are now received in evidence." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1955).
This amendment to the wrongful death statute was adopted in 1919. See Note, 1
N. C. L. REV. 113, 116 (1922). ARK. STATS. § 28-712 (1953).
"l State v. Puett, 210 N. C. 633, 188 S. E. 75 (1936); McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE§ 260; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 1433.
'
2 McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE § 260; STANSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 146 n. 11; 5
WIG MORE, EVIDENCE § 1344.
"State v. Gordon, 241 N. C. 356, 85 S. E. 2d 322 (1955) ; McCoRmIcK, Evi-
DENCE § 262; STANSBuRy, N. C. EVIDENCE § 146 n. 12, 13; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE§ 1445.
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the proposed exception, though it would seem sound to limit the ex-
ception to those things which the declarant would have been competent
to testify concerning had he been a witness at the trial.
6 4
It has long been settled that dying declarations will be received on
behalf of the defendant as well as the state. 5 Also, the findings of fact
on which the admissibility of such statements depends are for the trial
judge, his ruling being reviewable only to determine whether there was
evidence tending to show the facts necessary to the decision to admit
the declaration.6 These principles will not be affected by adoption
of the proposed exception.
It is felt that the changes in the exception for dying declarations
which the proposal would effect are wholesome and needed.
XII
STATEMENTS AS TO PEDIGREE AND FAMILY HISTORY
One of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule is that for statements
about family relationships, descent, births, marriages, deaths, and the
like. Unavailability of the declarant is a requirement everywhere, but
some jurisdictions such as North Carolina insist that the declarant be
dead.67 There is also a requirement that the statement have been made
before the origin of the present controversy. 68 There is some disagree-
ment about whether the person making the statement must have been
a member of the family whose history is concerned, the rule in North
Carolina apparently being that family relationship is necessary, though
not necessarily a blood relationship.69 Such statements may be oral
or they may be entries in family Bibles or on tombstones.
Rule 63 (23) provides an exception for a statement by one concern-
ing his own family history.70 Rule 63 (24) creates an exception for
a statement by a person concerning the family history of another. 71 Rule
" Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. REv. 43,
66-7 (1954).
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 261; STANSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 146 n. 94.
State v. Gordon, 241 N. C. 356, 85 S. E. 2d 322 (1955) ; State v. Rich, 231
N. C. 696, 58 S. E. 2d 717 (1950); STANSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 146 n. 21-2.
"' STANSBURY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 149 n. 69. There is support for the position
that other grounds of unavailability should be recognized. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1481.
" MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 297, STANsauRY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 149 n. 72;
5 WIGAORE, EVIDENCE § 1483.
60 Ashe v. Pettiford, 177 N. C. 132, 98 S. E. 304 (1919).
70 "A statement of a matter concerning a declarant's own birth, marriage, di-
vorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood or marriage, race-ancestry or other similar
fact of his family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring
personal knowledge of the matter declared, if the judge finds that the declarant is
unavailable."
' "A statement concerning the birth, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, race-
ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage or other similar fact of the family
history of a person other than the declarant if the judge (a) finds that the declarant
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63 (25) creates an exception for double hearsay in this area.72
It will be noted, first, that forms of unavailability within the definition
in Rule 62 (7) other than death of the declarant are recognized. Also,
greater liberality is shown in that a strict requirement of family relation-
ship is not insisted upon if the declarant was intimately associated with
the family concerned. There is no requirement that the statement have
been made prior to the origin of the present controversy. These ex-
tensions appear to be justified in view of the difficulty of proving such
matters in any other way where unavailability of the declarant does
exist. Experience would seem to support the view that such statements
have considerable reliability even in the absence of cross-examination.
Even so, the failure to incorporate a requirement that the statement
must have been made ante litem motam may be questioned. Statements
made after the controversy had arisen would certainly not be as trust-
worthy as those made before. The Commissioners point out that "at
common law much evidence of slight value may be admissible to prove
facts relating to pedigree, and it is in cases of this sort that Rule 45
may be applied to exclude what amounts to gossip or rumor or is other-
wise of trifling worth." 73
It is recognized that there is some overlapping with the general
exception based on unavailability, for some statements concerning family
history could qualify under that exception as well.74 The counterpart




There are several other matters relating to the hearsay rule which
should be mentioned. First, the Rules permit the impeachment of a
declarant whose hearsay statement is admitted into evidence under an
exception to the hearsay rule.7 5 This is the generally recognized rule
was related to the other by blood or marriage or finds that he was otherwise so in-
timately associated with the other's family as to be likely to have accurate in-
formation concerning the matter declared, and made the statement as upon informa-
tion received from the other or from a person related by blood or marriage to the
other, or as upon repute in the other's family, and (b) finds that the declarant
is unavailable as a witness."
72 "A statement of a declarant that a statement admissible under exceptions (23)
or (24) of this rule was made by another declarant, offered as tending to prove
the truth of the matter declared by both declarants, if the judge finds that both
dedarants are unavailable as witnesses."
73 UNIFORM RULES oF EVIDENCF, rule 63 (23), Comment.74UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 63 (4) (c).
" "Evidence of a statement or other conduct by a declarant inconsistent with a
statement received in evidence under an exception to Rule 63, is admissible for
the purpose of discrediting the declarant, though he had no opportunity to deny
or explain such inconsistent statement. Any other evidence tending to impair or
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and is followed in North Carolina.70 The fairness of such impeachment
is immediately apparent, but uncertainties have arisen concerning
whether impeachment by the use of prior inconsistent statements should
be permitted where the laying of a foundation would normally be re-
quired. No foundation can be laid where the declarant is absent. So
the Rules sensibly dispense with any requirement that he be asked about
his prior statement. Of course, cross-examination of the declarant for
the purpose of impeachment is not possible, but other impeaching evi-
dence is admissible if it would have been admissible had the declarant
been a witness.
The hearsay provisions of the Model Code of Evidence depended, in
part, on definitions which distinguished between first-hand hearsay and
other hearsay.77 Distinctions of this sort are made where needed in
the hearsay provisions of the Uniform Rules, but such confusing, albeit
logical, definitions are not perpetuated. As in the Model Code, there
is a specific provision dealing with multiple hearsay.78
There is no provision in the Uniform Rules for an exception dealing
with recorded past recollection. There is a view, of course, that such
a writing is incorporated by reference in the testimony of the witness
who vouches for its correctness and, therefore, is not hearsay. The pre-
ferred approach seems to be, however, that it is hearsay since the
writing is a statement made out of court which is offered to prove the
truth of the matters recited therein.70  In any event, the principle is
generally recognized.80 The omission of any specific provision concern-
ing it in the Uniform Rules will cause no difficulty because the exception
provided by Rule 63 (1) making admissible previous statements of
persons present and subject to cross-examination will admit such evi-
dence without any specific exception being provided for it.
It is hoped that this study of the hearsay provisions of the Uniform
Rules will help stimulate a consideration of the Rules as a whole to the
end that their adoption might be realized. There has been a great
deal of reform in the field of procedure, but the law of evidence is still
support the credibility of the declarant is admissible if it would have been ad-
missible had the declarant been a witness." UNioRm RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 65.
"'Id. Comment; STANS BRY, N. C. EvIDENCE § 39.
7 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 501 (1942); Ladd, A Modern Code of Evi-
dence, MoDEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 329, 351-2 (1942).
" "A statement within the scope of an exception to Rule 63 shall not be in-
admissible on the ground that it includes a statement made by another declarant
and is offered to prove the truth of the included statement if such included state-
ment itself meets the requirements of an exception." UNIFORm RuLES OF EVIDENCE,
rule 66.
11 McCoRmicic, EVIDENCE § 276; Morgan, Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40
HARv. L. REv. 712 (1927).
1O McCORmIcK, EVIDENCE § 276; STANSBuRY, N. C. EVIDENCE § 33; 3 WimGoE,
EVIDENCE §§ 734-57.
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largely untouched. The two modern attempts at codification of modem
and rational rules of evidence show that reform by this method is
possible, and there is little doubt but that there is demand for simplified
and less obstructive rules.
The main objections to the Model Code of Evidence have been
overcome in the Uniform Rules, so the way would seem to be clear for
legislative consideration of evidence reform. In order that local modifi-
cations might be considered and the Rules subjected to close scrutiny
for the purpose of making legislative recommendations, it is suggested
that an agency such as the General Statutes Commission or the Judicial
Council appoint a committee to begin such a study. It will not be easy
to effect reform in this field, but it is not going to be easy to do without
it. Certainly, without a beginning there is little hope for improvement
in the law of evidence in any jurisdiction.
